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Temporary organizational forms and coopetition in cycling: What makes a breakaway 
successful in the Tour de France? 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: In road cycling races, one of riders’ main objectives is to win stages, which most 
often requires breaking away from the pack of riders. What is it that makes a breakaway 
succeed, i.e. enable one of its members to win the stage? 
Design/methodology/approach: Descriptive statistics were computed and a logit model of 
breakaway success was estimated, based on a new kind of statistical data describing the 
development of each of the 268 breakaways that occurred in the 76 regular stages of the Tour 
de France 2013 to 2016. 
Findings: Breakaway success partly depends on the physics of cycling: breakaways are more 
successful when the stage is hilly or in mountain than flat. In addition, the likelihood of 
breakaway success depends on strategic moves such as attack timing and the percentage of 
riders with a teammate in the breakaway. 
Research limitations/implications: Understanding why certain breakaways succeed and 
others do not is useful to comprehend cycling performance and to help coopetitive temporary 
organizational forms such as breakaways optimize their strategic behavior. A limitation is the 
focus on the Tour de France only. 
Originality/value: The present study adds to the literature on temporary organizational forms, 
coopetition and cycling performance by analyzing within-stage data in cycling and, as such, 
enabling to capture its strategic dimension. 
Keywords: temporary organizational forms, coopetition, cycling, breakaway, strategic 
behavior, Tour de France. 
Article Classification: Research Paper. 
Introduction 
 
More than 50 years after the first publication on the subject (Miles, 1964), temporary 
organizational forms seem to be becoming increasingly prevalent in our globalized fast-paced 
economy (Bakker, 2010). Bakker (2010, p. 468) defines this form of organization as “a set of 
organizational actors working together on a complex task over a limited period of time”. The 
author underlines the fact that this definition spans a relatively broad number of organizational 
forms, e.g. sports event organizing committees (Løwendahl, 1995). The present research is also 
interested in temporary organizational forms in the sport industry but with regards to the sport 
activity itself rather than event organizing committees. Indeed, the focus is on breakaways in 
cycling and, more exactly, the determinants of breakaway success. 
A breakaway can be defined as a set of riders (or a rider alone) from one or different 
‘permanent’ teams (as opposed to the ‘temporary’ team corresponding to the breakaway) 
supposed to work together over a limited period of time on a complex task (spending a relevant 
amount of effort to be managed over time according to the race or stage’s profile to enable the 
breakaway to be successful). This task is even more complex because the different riders may 
have the same objective (winning the race or stage) but only one rider may win the race or 
stage, or they may have different objectives (winning the race or stage, finishing before riders 
likely to be among the first with regards to the general classification, helping his leader or 
teammate also present in the breakaway and more likely to win the race or stage, being in the 
breakaway to enable his team to produce a minimal effort in the pack of riders or “peloton”…). 
As such, a breakaway seems to be characterized by the notion of ‘problematic preferences’ 
(general lack of consensus regarding individual and organizational goals) which is one of the 
main properties of ‘organized anarchies’ (Bathelt & Gibson, 2015). 
A breakaway is a very specific temporary organizational form as it does not fit with the 
definition of “temporary” as provided by Bakker (2010). Indeed, Bakker (2010, p. 466) defines 
“temporary” as “characterized by an ex ante defined limited period of time of interaction 
between members”. Nevertheless, there is no ex ante defined period of time of interaction 
between members for a breakaway. Indeed, the time of interaction is not known ex ante but 
depends on the length of the race or stage, the speed of the breakaway (likely to depend on the 
speed of the “peloton”), whether the “peloton” catches up or not the breakaway, whether all 
riders present at the start of the breakaway remain within it… There is even no ex ante 
agreement about the breakaway which emerges during the race or stage. As such, the study of 
the determinants of breakaway success can make a useful and original contribution to the 
literature on temporary organizational forms. 
The study of the determinants of breakaway success can also contribute to the literature 
on coopetition. This can be defined as simultaneous cooperation and competition 
(Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). Since the seminal book of Brandenburger and Nalebuff 
(1996), coopetition has been the subject of an increasing amount of research in the field of 
strategic management, with an essential question being its impact on performance (Le Roy & 
Czakon, 2016). In sport, this notion of coopetition is highly relevant in the sense that if 
opponents are competitors on the field, they need each other to produce the competition and, as 
such, they are economic partners. Some articles have dealt with coopetition in professional 
football (Lardo, Trequattrini, Lombardi & Rosso, 2016; Robert, Marques & Le Roy, 2009). In 
cycling, coopetition is even more relevant because it is not limited to teams agreeing to compete 
in the same event (economic cooperation) but it is also present during the race itself (sporting 
cooperation). In particular, a breakaway fits with the idea of coopetition since riders from 
different ‘permanent’ teams have to cooperate to improve their likelihood of success. 
Eventually, a breakaway can be seen as a coopetitive temporary organizational form. 
To better understand a breakaway as a coopetitive temporary organizational form and the 
determinants of breakaway success, this article first reviews the existing literature on temporary 
organizational forms, coopetition and performance, and the determinants of performance and 
strategic behavior in road cycling. This enables to make several hypotheses concerning the 
parameters which should affect a breakaway’s likelihood of success, i.e. the chance that one of 
the breakaway riders wins the stage (rather than all of them are caught up by the peloton). 
Statistical data are presented, describing the development of each of the 268 breakaways that 
occurred in the 76 regular stages of the Tour de France 2013 to 2016. Then, hypotheses are 
tested by estimating a logit model and implications are suggested along with some limitations 
and future directions. 
 
Literature review 
 
Temporary organizational forms 
 
In his review of the literature on temporary organizational forms, Bakker (2010) organizes his 
discussion around the concepts time, team, task and context, relying on three of the four 
concepts also underlined by Lundin and Söderholm (1995) who use transition instead of 
context. Here, the focus is on the concepts time, team and task. Based on Grabher (2002) and 
Jones and Lichtenstein (2008), Bakker (2010) notes that time is regarded as being probably one 
of the most salient dimensions of temporary organizational forms; and has been variously 
proposed to be short (Lanzara, 1983) and/or limited (Grabher, 2004). Applied to a breakaway 
in cycling, time is even shorter and limited since it is no more than a couple of hours while the 
literature on temporary organizational forms focuses on duration of several days (Morris, 
Farrell & Reed, 2016), weeks (Bechky, 2006) and years (Sydow, Lindkvist & DeFillippi, 2004). 
Nevertheless, some questions related to time relevant to temporary organizational forms in 
general remain appropriate for a breakaway, e.g. how do the degree and pattern of co-operation 
evolve in temporal organizational forms and how is this influenced by the approaching deadline 
(Ness & Haugland, 2005)? For a breakaway, the peculiarity of the deadline is that it is not a 
specific time but it depends on whether the breakaway is near the finishing line and the 
following riders are close to the breakaway, elements that depend themselves on the stage’s 
profile: being at five kilometers from the finishing line or having an advance of one minute at 
five kilometers from the finishing line has not the same meaning whether the stage is flat or a 
mountain stage. 
With regards to team, Bakker (2010) underlines the need for swift trust (Meyerson, Weick 
& Kramer, 1996; Saunders & Ahuja, 2006; Xu et al., 2007). In respect to a breakaway in 
cycling, such trust may even require to be immediate since riders attempting to break away need 
to create a sufficient gap with the ‘peloton’ to secure the breakaway, which may require the 
immediate collaboration between them. As for a temporary team in general, communication in 
a breakaway is important to co-ordinate tasks and should adhere to norms of respectful 
interaction (Miles, 1964; Weick, 1993). If a member acts as a “free rider” and, as such, does 
not adhere to norms of respectful interaction, this may compromise the breakaway. Leadership 
is also an important feature (Bryman et al., 1987; Tyssen, Wald & Spieth, 2013, 2014). In 
cycling, it might be impacted by the respective ranking / time difference to the leader in the 
general classification of the different riders involved in the breakaway. Team design is also 
crucial (Morley & Silver, 1977; Perretti & Negro, 2006) but is unlikely to be decided ex ante 
for a breakaway in cycling. Last, another important characteristic is the heterogeneity of 
members (Tyssen et al., 2013, 2014). In cycling, whether some riders present in the breakaway 
are from the same ‘permanent’ team(s) or not and their nationalities can be some indicators of 
heterogeneity. 
In respect of task, Meyerson et al. (1996) highlight its complexity and that it is 
characterized as being finite, i.e. as having a deadline. These elements are consistent with those 
already developed above for a breakaway in cycling, as is the fact that when the task is 
completed, the temporary system disbands (Baker & Faulkner, 1991; DeFillippi, 2002; 
Sorenson & Waguespack, 2006). As such, it runs the risk of knowledge dispersing (Grabher, 
2002, 2004; Sydow et al., 2004). Nevertheless, two peculiarities of a breakaway in cycling is 
that if it is unlikely that the temporary system will be formed again with exactly the same team 
design and the task is the same for each breakaway, i.e. winning the race or stage. Consequently, 
‘permanent’ teams and riders can learn from previous breakaways. This is true even if they did 
not take part in them since races or stages are usually broadcast and recorded, meaning that 
teams and riders can watch them live or pre-recorded. It is also important to mention that in 
cycling, the task is different whether the race or stage is flat, hilly or mountain for reasons 
related to physics as developed later. 
 
Coopetition and performance 
 
Le Roy and Czakon (2016) highlight several studies about the link between coopetition and 
performance, with the latter envisaged both as innovation performance (Belderbos, Carree & 
Lokshin, 2004; Le Roy, Robert & Lasch, 2016; Neyens, Faems & Sels, 2010; Nieto & 
Santamaría, 2007; Quintana-García & Benavides-Velasco, 2004) and economic, financial or 
market performance (Kim & Parkhe, 2009; Le Roy & Sanou, 2014; Luo, Rindfleisch & Tse, 
2007; Morris, Koçak & Özer, 2007; Oum, Park, Kim & Yu, 2004; Peng, Pike, Yang & Roos, 
2012; Ritala, 2012; Ritala, Hallikas & Sissonen, 2008; Robert et al., 2009). These studies show 
mixed results with some demonstrating a positive link between coopetition and performance 
(Belderbos et al., 2004; Le Roy et al., 2016; Le Roy & Sanou, 2014; Morris et al., 2007; Neyens 
et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2012; Quintana-García & Benavides-Velasco, 2004; Robert et al., 
2009), others a negative link (Kim & Parkhe, 2009; Nieto & Santamaría, 2007; Ritala et al., 
2008) and the two remaining studies mixed effects (Luo et al., 2007; Oum et al., 2004). In their 
study on French football clubs, Robert et al. (2009) substantiated that coopetition does not 
improve their sporting performance, but does improve their economic performance. 
According to Le Roy and Czakon (2016), the missing link is the management of 
coopetitive tensions. They are located at three different levels: inter-organizational, intra-
organizational and inter-individual (Fernandez, Le Roy & Gnyawali, 2014). If we focus on the 
inter-organizational level, firms have to cooperate in order to create common value but they are 
in competition to capture that value. This can be applied to a breakaway: riders have to 
cooperate so that the breakaway may be successful but only one rider will win if the breakaway 
is indeed successful. 
 
Determinants of cycling performance 
 
The study of performance is less developed in cycling than in other sports, partly because 
performance is not easy to measure or even define in this sport (Cabaud et al., 2015, pp. 259-
263). Indeed, in cycling all riders are in teams and within teams most riders do not aim at 
optimizing their own performance but at optimizing their team leader’s performance. In 
addition, two team leaders’ objectives may be different and (at least partly) compatible, which 
makes it difficult to compare their performances. Due to these and other complexities of 
cycling, several kinds of studies of performance may be conducted. 
Some cycling performance studies bear on the determinants of a rider’s victories over 
several races. For instance, over the 2011 season, riders’ “quotient points” per kilometer of 
competition depend on their age and the race calendar they chose, but the characteristic which 
determines performance the most is being the team leader (Rodriguez-Guttiérez, 2014).  
Most studies, however, bear on the determinants of a rider or team’s race victory. These 
studies tend to show that individual performance in a race partly depends on team 
characteristics, including teammates’ performance. Thus, a rider’s final ranking in the 2004 
Tour de France is positively related to a lower body mass index, previous successes and being 
the team leader, but it is also related to teammates’ performances (Torgler, 2007), presumably 
because teammates help each other perform well. These results were also found in a study on 
riders’ final ranking in the 2002-2005 Tour de France, a study which also showed that riders’ 
performance partly depends on teammates or coaches’ experience and too many good riders 
within one team negatively affect performance (Prinz & Wicker, 2012). Other studies show that 
team performance in a race largely depends on the same characteristics as individual 
performance; at least, this is the case in the 2007-2011 Tour de France teams (Rogge et al., 
2013). In a recent study on the Tour de France between 2004 and 2013, Prinz and Wicker (2016) 
show that diversity in terms of tenure significantly adds to team performance, while diversity 
in skills (proxied by body mass index) decreases performance. They also find that the more 
teammates arrive in Paris, the better the team’s performance. 
Very few studies bear on the determinants of a rider’s stage win. Among riders who 
finished the 2009 Vuelta a España or 2010 Tour de France, it has been shown that a rider’s poor 
performance in a stage increases his chances of being in a successful breakaway the day after 
(and this is particularly true at the end of stage races), which is an indication of within-race 
strategic resting (Maria Raya, 2015). Larson and Maxcy (2014) study not so much the 
determinants of a rider’s stage win as the determinants of a stage’s type of finish, either through 
a breakaway or a sprinting peloton. They use the share of Grand Tour stages whose winner 
came from a breakaway rather than from the sprinting peloton, which they call “the likelihood 
of breakaway success,” to examine potential changes in outcomes associated with the use of 
two-way radio technology by competitors and team directors. (The authors classify a breakaway 
outcome as when more than a 10 second spread separates the first twenty-five riders to finish a 
race. They alternatively classify a race finish as a sprint if the next twenty-four finishers in a 
race finish within 10 seconds of the race winner.) They show that the period in which radios 
were used (1992-2010 in the study) is associated with a significant increase in the breakaway 
success compared to the 1985-1991 period. Nevertheless, when controlling for stage types, the 
authors find a significant negative impact of radio technology for hilly and flat terrain compared 
to mountain terrain. It is worth noting that Larson and Maxcy (2014) do not investigate within-
stage determinants of any specific breakaway’s stage win, such as attack timing, number of 
breakaway riders or time difference to the leader of the best-ranked breakaway rider. 
Despite their value, these studies seem to lack two important elements. First, by focusing 
on the results of whole races or whole stages, they do not take into account the developments 
of any stage over time, which means that to date nothing is known about the dynamics of cycling 
stages. Second, by not including within-stage data, these studies of sport performance deprive 
cycling of what is perhaps its most distinctive – and interesting – aspect, i.e. its strategic 
dimension. Indeed, although performance in cycling certainly depends on individual (physical) 
and team (physical and economic) characteristics, it likely also depends on within-stage 
strategic decisions which have never been studied yet, let alone their potential impact on the 
performance of the breakaway or other coopetitive temporary organizational forms. 
 
How physics and game theory can help understand cycling strategy 
 
“In competitive cycling on the flat, air resistance is by far the greatest force opposing the 
forward motion of a cyclist. Air resistance can be dramatically reduced by riding in the 
slipstream of another rider or vehicle. The following rider will then enjoy the low pressure area 
behind the lead rider” (Olds, 1998). “Drafting,” i.e. riding in the shelter of another cyclist or 
group of cyclists and staying out of the wind, confers a very substantial advantage: the back 
rider is able to reduce his effort by up to 40 % (Dilger & Geyer, 2009). This major physical fact 
is why riders very often have to choose between “cooperating”, i.e. letting someone else draft 
in hopes that he will sooner or later reciprocate the move, and “defecting”, i.e. not letting anyone 
draft in hopes for unilateral defection and a victory against all other riders. A cycling stage may 
thus be seen as a series of strategic interactions whereby each rider anticipates on others’ moves 
in order to cooperate as much as possible (this spares energy) while also defecting when it helps 
win. In mountain stages, where riders have to fight mostly against the gravity of their mass 
(rather than against air resistance), cooperation among riders is less useful to riders’ 
performance. 
The applications of game theory to road cycling are few (Mignot, 2015a), and they have 
not been tested empirically, which means that to date nothing is known about the effect of 
riders’ strategic decisions on their performance. Therefore, while many determinants of cycling 
performance are well known empirically, this is not the case of the determinants of breakaway 
success, let alone the effect of race strategy on breakaway success. The authors believe it is 
time to take into account race strategy to better understand the developments of breakaways, 
road cycling races and coopetitive temporary organizational forms in general. 
 
Determinants of breakaway success: hypotheses 
 
Effects of stage profile on the likelihood of breakaway success 
 
Compared to most peloton riders, who ride in a pack and are shielded against air resistance by 
other peloton riders, breakaway riders have to use more energy to fight against air resistance. 
Consequently, the faster a stage is, the more the peloton riders have a relative physical 
advantage over breakaway riders. Over more than a century, Grand Tour stages have become 
much shorter and faster (Mignot, 2015b). This enables us to formulate several hypotheses 
derived from the physics of cycling. 
Hypothesis 1a: A breakaway’s likelihood of success will be higher when the stage is 
slower. 
Hypothesis 1b: A breakaway’s likelihood of success will be higher when the stage is 
shorter. 
Hypothesis 1c: A breakaway’s likelihood of success will be higher when the stage is a 
mountain stage rather than a hilly stage or a hilly stage rather than a flat stage.  
 
Effects of strategic considerations on the likelihood of breakaway success 
 
Although the physics of cycling is likely a major determinant of the likelihood of breakaway 
success, the strategy of cycling may be another one. When a rider has to decide when to attack, 
he faces a dilemma (Mignot, 2015a, pp. 213-219). If he attacks too early, he will get exhausted 
sooner and he will end up easily caught up by the peloton. And if he attacks too late, the peloton 
will make it much harder for him to break away in the first place because more teams with a 
sprinter will not want to lose the opportunity of the stage finishing in a sprint. One of the 
consequences of this dilemma is that a rider should attack right before the moment when 
delaying the attack starts reducing his chances of winning the stage (Polak, 2008), a moment 
called optimal attack timing. One hypothesis may be based on this notion. 
Hypothesis 2: A breakaway’s likelihood of success will first tend to increase in the early 
portion of the stage, then peak (optimal attack timing), and finally it will tend to decrease 
(inverse u-shaped relationship).  
When a breakaway rider has to decide whether – or to what extent – he should cooperate 
with the other breakaway riders, he once again faces a dilemma (Albert, 1991; Mignot, 2015a, 
pp. 220-226). If he lets others draft he risks cooperating unilaterally and being the “sucker.” 
And if he will not let anyone draft him, no one else will let him draft and he will be unlikely to 
win against everyone else. A strong rider in the breakaway may be willing to ride in the wind 
to gain time on the peloton, or to build a strong reputation as a cooperator. However, this case 
does not seem typical, and breakaways as well as other coopetitive temporary organizational 
forms usually generate cooperation problems, i.e. riders hoping to free ride to victory at the 
expense of others. Four hypotheses may be based on the difficulties of cooperation within 
breakaways. 
Hypothesis 3a: A breakaway’s likelihood of success will increase when the number of 
breakaway riders is lower than some threshold. At the same time, a breakaway’s likelihood of 
success will increase when the number of breakaway riders is higher than some threshold. 
Overall, the number of breakaway riders will first increase then decrease then increase again 
the chances that they will win the stage (cubic relationship).  
Hypothesis 3b: A breakaway’s likelihood of success will be higher when some riders are 
from the same team(s). 
Hypothesis 3c: A breakaway’s likelihood of success will be higher when fewer 
nationalities are represented.  
Hypothesis 3d: A breakaway’s likelihood of success will be higher when the best-ranked 
breakaway rider is far from the leader in the general classification.  
 
Method 
 
Information was collected on each of the 268 breakaways that occurred in the 76 stages of the 
Tour de France 2013 to 2016. These pieces of information are: the moment when a breakaway 
was created; the identity of each rider belonging to the breakaway; the time difference to the 
leader in the general classification at the beginning of the stage for the breakaway rider with 
the best ranking.  
To collect these data, breakaways were defined in the following way, based on Cabaud et 
al. (2015). The first hours of a stage are each divided into 15-minute time intervals, and in this 
context a breakaway is accounted if it is still alive in the following 15-minute time interval. The 
last hour of a stage is divided into 20 3-minute time intervals, and once again a breakaway is 
accounted if it is still alive in the following 3-minute time interval. Since the number of riders 
in the breakaway is a variable of interest and it can change during a stage, it is considered that 
there is a new breakaway when such a change occurs. This means that several breakaways can 
be successful in the same stage, e.g. the ‘good’ breakaway is formed early with 15 riders then 
5 of them break away from the group and fight together to win the stage. One specific kind of 
breakaways is not taken into account: those with a favourite winning a mountain stage by 
jumping away at the very end. 
All these data are mainly collected thanks to specialized websites that provide a detailed 
written report live. These websites are www.letour.fr complemented by www.eurosport.fr and 
www.cyclingnews.com. Each information is associated to its time, which enables to find when 
it occurred during the race by comparison with the departure time. 
The main file thus contains information on breakaways. The focus is on the share of 
breakaways ending in one of the breakaway riders’ stage victory, also called the rate of 
breakaway success. 
 Results 
 
A logit model of the odds that a breakaway is successful rather than unsuccessful is tested. The 
dataset comprises 268 breakaways, of which 83 were successful and 185 were unsuccessful. 
Based on our hypotheses, the explanatory variables are as follows: speed (1a), distance (1b), 
hilly and mountain stages (1c, flat stages being the reference), attack timing in time percentage 
of the stage duration (2), number of riders (3a), percentage of riders with teammates in the 
breakaway (3b), percentage of different nationalities (3c) and time difference to the general 
classification leader of the best-ranked rider in the breakaway (3d). Descriptive statistics and 
results are shown in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Results are based on bootstrap standard errors 
with 100,000 replications. We first tested our model with the square (u-shaped / inverse u-
shaped relationship) then also the square and the cubic form of attack timing and the number of 
riders but did not find any significant result so we did not include these in our final model. Hilly 
and mountain stages, attack timing and percentage of riders with teammates have a significant 
positive impact while speed, distance, number of riders, percentage of different nationalities 
and time difference to the leader have no significant impact. 
 
Table 1 
 
Table 2 
 
These results were expected for hilly and mountain stages and percentage of riders with 
teammates. However, the significant positive impact of attack timing was not necessarily 
expected as we anticipated a negative impact beyond a certain threshold. We expected a 
negative impact of speed, distance and percentage of different nationalities which is not 
confirmed by our data. The risk of misunderstanding between riders from different nationalities 
may be limited by the fact that they follow the strategy put in place by their team managers. 
This would mediate the relationships between riders in the breakaway. We also expected a 
positive impact of time difference to the leader, again not confirmed by our data. We had no 
specific expectation for the number of riders which is not significant. This result is discussed 
further below in the light of the idea of coopetitive temporary organizational form. 
 
Implications, limitations and future directions 
 
Our results have some implications for management and team theory as they enable to illustrate 
the concepts time, team and task developed by Bakker (2010) for temporary organizational 
forms and also coopetition. 
With regards to time, our results show the importance of attack timing in cycling. A 
breakaway is more likely to be successful if it does not attack too early: only six breakaways 
won after an attack during the first 10% of a stage and most of the successful breakaways 
attacked during the last 20% of a stage. This demonstrates that important efforts should not be 
produced at the beginning of a project but rather saved for the final steps, when the deadline is 
approaching. 
With regards to team, our results show the importance of the percentage of riders with 
teammates in the breakaway but not of the number of riders and the percentage of nationalities. 
This should not be interpreted as meaning that riders cooperate only with their teammates in 
the breakaway and reject coopetition within this temporary organizational form. Indeed, riders 
with teammates have still to cooperate with other riders to make the breakaway successful. 
Besides, there is a strong correlation between the number of riders and the percentage of riders 
with teammates in the breakaway (0.80). In other words, a breakaway with more riders is more 
likely to have teams represented by more than one rider and, as such, to have a higher percentage 
of riders with teammates. When we deleted the percentage of riders with teammates in the 
breakaway in our model, the number of riders became significant. Eventually, having riders 
with teammates in the breakaway may help provide more organization in what may have been 
anarchy, consistent with the notion of ‘organized anarchies’ (Bathelt & Gibson, 2015). 
With regards to task, our results show the importance of stage profile. A breakaway is 
more likely to be successful in hilly or mountain stages which represent a more difficult task 
than flat stages. This demonstrates that it is easier to make a difference when a challenge is hard 
enough. Nevertheless, a rider still needs the help of others not necessarily from the same team, 
demonstrating the need for coopetition. 
Our research has some limitations, opening the door for future directions. The study of 
the Tour de France only is the first limitation. Further research is needed to compare riders’ 
strategic behavior in different races, e.g. between different Grand Tours or between Grand 
Tours and one-day races. Another limitation is that the same number of riders and percentage 
of riders with teammates in two different breakaways may hide different kinds of coopetition 
between riders. A more qualitative approach based on interviews with riders may help better 
understand the exact processes behind our data. 
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